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Tiny Intelligence Ltd v Resport Ltd SC 55/2008
[2009] NZSC 35
This was a Supreme Court decision on the availability of
additional damages for copyright infringement where an
account of profits has been awarded.
The respondent, Resport Ltd, had infringed the appellant,
Tiny Intelligence's, copyright in artistic works, being designs
for a toy sword and toy trumpet, and had marketed infrin
ging copies to supporters of the Crusaders rugby team. The
High Court issued an injunction and account of profits, but,
although finding that the infringement was flagrant, dis
missed a claim for additional damages under s 1212 of the
Copyright Act 1994.' This decision was upheld by the Court
of Appeal.2 Tiny Intelligence Ltd was granted leave to appeal
the decision of the Court of Appeal on the issue:
Whether the Court of Appeal was correct to decide that
"additional damages" under s 1212 of the Copyright
Act 1994 cannot be awarded when the plaintiff elects as
its principal relief an account of profits.
Tiny Intelligence argued that additional damages under s 1212
were a separate and discrete form of relief available in
addition to any other relief provided for in s 120. It argued
that s 1212 provided a sui generis remedy of additional
damages that could be awarded when an account of profits
was elected, as it served a different purpose from, and was
not inconsistent with, an account of profits.
The Supreme Court said that the appropriate starting
point was the wording of ss 120 and 121, which were
inter-related. The Court compared them to provisions deal
ing with relief in proceedings for infringement of the other
intellectual property rights, and said that there was nothing
in those statutes indicating a departure from the longstand
ing principle that damages and an account of profits could
not be obtained for the same wrongful act. It was accepted
that, under s 24 of the Copyright Act 1962, additional
damages could not be regarded as a stand-alone remedy
distinct from damages and could not be awarded when an
account of profits had been elected.
The Court said that, on the wording of ss 120 and 121, it
was difficult to see a justification for construing the word
"damages" in the two sections as having different meanings.
The disentitlement to damages against innocent infringers in
s 1211 clearly related to those damages that might other
wise have been awarded under s 1201. The heading of s 121
indicated that subs 2 was a provision as to damages and the
term "additional damages" in its ordinary meaning con
veyed the sense of further or more damages, and did not,
without explicit words, identify an independent form of
relief different from damages. The Court did not accept the
argument that s 1212 must provide for a separate form of
relief because damages awarded under s 120 would include
aggravated and exemplary damages. The Court found it
more likely that, where, as in the present case, there had been
included an express provision prescribing considerations
that would be relevant to aggravated or exemplary damages,
the legislature would not have intended that "damages" in
s 120 should include aggravated and exemplary damages.
The Court found support for this view in the legislative
history, which it reviewed in some detail. The Court found
that the United Kingdom legislature in enacting the Copy
right Act 19S6, on which the New Zealand Copyright
Act 1962 was based, did not consider that the prior statutory
authority to award damages included exemplary damages.
The Court said that the New Zealand legislature must be
taken to have proceeded on the same basis. The same word
ing was retained for s 1202 of the 1994 Act. The Court
therefore did not accept the argument that unless providing a
separate further remedy s 1212 had no work to do. The
Court also held that the amendments to the provisions in the
1994 Act, which were based on the United Kingdom 1988
Act,4 were intended to enhance the additional damages re
medy.
The Court then reviewed the authorities. The Court was
critical of the decision of Laddie J in Cala Homes South Ltd
v Alfred McAlpine Homes East Ltd No. 2. Like the Court
of Appeal, the Supreme Court preferred the reasoning of the
House of Lords in the Redrow Homes case4 which overruled
the Cala Homes case.
The Court also considered the policy arguments. The
Court said that it was clear that the appellant's objective was
to obtain compensation for loss said to be outside the account
1. Tiny Intelligence Ltd v Resport Ltd High Court Christchurch CIV-203-409-352,21 November 2005, John Hansen J.
2. Tiny Intelligence Ltd v Resport Ltd [2008] NZCA 281.
3. Based on the Report of the Gregory Committee, Copyright Committee, Report of the Copyright Committee,
Chairman, H S Gregory, Cmnd 8662, 1952.
4. Based on the Report of the Whitford Committee, Report of the Committee to consider the Law on Copyright and
Designs, Chairman, The Honourable Ms Justice Whitford Cmnd 6732, March 1977.
5. [1996] FSR 36 ChD.
6. Redrow Homes Ltd v Ben Brothers plc [1999] 1 AC 197.
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of profits remedy, contending that in many instances an
account of profits would not necessarily be an adequate or
fully compensatory remedy. The Court said that this seemed
to be advocating a punitive damages remedy to overcome
inadequacy of compensation secured through an account of
profits, and seemed to be an attempt to secure both compen
satory damages and an account of profits. The position
under the former statutory provisions and generally in equit
was that the punitive remedy of exemplary damages could
not be obtained in addition to an account of profits. There
fore, to reach the result sought by the appellant it would be
necessary to find that the legislature intended to effect a
significant departure from the basic principle that the re
medies of damages and an account were inconsistent. The
Court did not accept this interpretation, which was not
supported by the legislative history. In addition, the Court
said that, if the appellant's approach were correct, an award
of additional damages would be available against an inno
cent infringe; but s 1211 expressly provided that an award
of damages could not be made against an innocent infringer.
It would be unusual to give the term "damages" different
meanings in the same section, and there was consistent
protection for innocent infringers throughout the intellectual
property statutes. On the appellant's argument, losses that
could not be sought from an innocent infringer because of
s 1211 might be recovered under s 1212, and that could
not be right. The Court also said that there would be practi
cal problems of quantification, as it would be necessary to
attempt to assess the extent to which the account of profits
compensated the plaintiff for claimed losses before any addi
tional damages could be considered.
The Supreme Court also reiterated two points made by
the Court of Appeal, first that the very election of remedy
puts the successful plaintiff in the position to determine
which remedy will better compensate for losses suffered, and
second that any additional damages, if awarded, would not
avail a plaintiff should they be treated as an expense for the
defendant when accounting for profits.
The Supreme Court said that if there truly was a gap in the
available remedies, it had existed for a long time in respect of
all of the statutory intellectual property rights. If a change
was perceived to be in the interests of justice it should receive
consideration as a matter of policy by the legislature. It said
that, had it been the intention of Parliament in 1994 to
depart from general principle and introduce a new stand
alone remedy, much more explicit language would have been
used.
The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent of
$15,000.
DaimlerAG Formerly DalmlerChryslerAG
V SANY Group Co Ltd
High Court, Wellington CIV 200g-485-2333, 22 April2009,
Iv.[iller J
This was an oral judgment on an application to adduce
further evidence on an appeal from a decision of the Assistant
Commissioner of Trade Marks. The application was a suc
cessful one.
Both parties made trucks and heavy vehicles. The respon
dent, Sany's, mark was a composite mark of the name
"SANY" with associated three-pointed star logo. The appel
lant, Daimle; contended that the mark was confusingly
similar to its three-pointed star mark which was registered
with and without the name "Mercedes-Benz".
The evidence sought to be adduced was an affidavit from
the appellanfs lawyer, with attached images from the Sany
website showing the use of the log with and without the word
"SANY" on the cabs of its vehicles. Also attached was a
photograph of a Sany vehicle, and decisions relating to Sany's
applications in other jurisdictions.
The Judge said that High Court Rule 20.16 applied,
conferring a general discretion on the Court to be exercised
in accordance with the objective of the Rules. The principles
were well-established. The Judge accepted that the appli
cant's task was a little easier in trade mark cases, because a
trade mark was a monopoly and there was a public interest in
ensuring it was not conferred in error. The onus was on the
applicant for the mark to show that it would not cause
confusion.
The Judge first put the decisions from tribunals in other
jurisdictions aside as not being admissible evidence. To the
extent that they were persuasive, they could be cited in
argument. The Judge then said that appellant had not shown
that the evidence about use of the mark could not have been
obtained and called with reasonable diligence, although it
did not in fact have the material. Howeve; the Judge held
that the Court might find the evidence strongly probative,
and that it might show that Sany had used its name in
conjunction with the appellant's logo and that it used the
logo without the name, contrary to its evidence before the
Assistant Commissioner. The evidence was also credible, and
it provided pictorial evidence of what was said in evidence.
The Judge adopted the words of Williams J in Indtex
Trading ltd v The Otago Rugby Football Union,8 where the
Judge said that the principal basis for granting the applica
tion was that the appeal and associated proceedings should
be able to be determined with all the appropriate relevant
evidence before the Court.
The Judge held that, for the purposes of Rule 20.16, there
were special reasons to grant the leave to file the evidence,
once amended to exclude the overseas decisions. Leave was
granted, and Sany had leave to file evidence in reply.
0/era Real Estate Ltd v S/in & Anor
High Court, Christchurch, CIV 2007-409-0003 10, 20 May
2009, French J
This was an oral judgment in a proceeding where there was
no appearance on behalf of either defendant.
The plaintiff was a real estate agent with a property
managementdivision, bywhich the first defendantwas employed
for much of 2006. The second defendant was also a property
management company, incorporated in November 2006 by a
man who was former sales manager for the plaintiff com
pany, and who was in a personal relationship with the first
defendant. The plaintiff claimed that the first defendant,
7. The Judge referred to Telecom Corporation ofNew Zealand v Commerce Commission [1991] 2 NZLR 557.
8. High Court, Auckland Al' 23-SW 01, 1 June 2001, Williams J.
New Zealand Intellectual Property Journal August 2009 577
IP ROUND-UP
before leaving its employment, had downloaded and copied
virtually all of the plaintiff's database and computer records
and made these available to the second defendant. The
plaintiff also alleged that the first defendant encouraged
clients of the plaintiff to use her personal cell phone number.
Evidence of the allegations was provided.
Against the first defendant, the plaintiff pleaded breach of
the implied contractual duty of fidelity owed by an employee
to an employer, breach of confidence, and infringement of
copyright. Against the second defendant the plaintiff pleaded
infringement of copyright, knowing receipt of confidential
information, and deliberate interfering with trade by unlaw
ful means. The plaintiff sought a final injunction and da
mages.
The Judge said that the matter could properly proceed by
way of formal proof. The Judge was satisfied that plaintiff
had proved the allegations to the requisite standard. The
Judge ordered that the interim injunctions previously granted
be made fiaal, and delivery up of copies of the copyright
works. The Judge also entered judgment against the first
defendant of $106,039 with interest. Orders were also made
for costs and disbursements, including indemnity costs which
were held to be appropriate on the facts because of evidence
of flagrant misconduct.
Stallion P/astics Ltd v Mcinnes
High Court, Wellington CIV 2008-485-002250, 29 April
2009, Dobson J
This was a successful appeal against an interlocutory deci
sion of an Assistant Commissioner of Patents, under s 97 of
the Pateats Act 1953.
The respoadeat, Mr Mclnnes, was the applicant for a
patent for a claimed invention for a mobile animal feeder. He
was not represented at the High Court hearing. The appel
lant, Stallion Plastics, opposed the patent application.
The appeal, and the interlocutory decision of the Assistant
Commissioner, was on two issues: 1 the appropriate scope
of pleading of grounds of opposition, particularly references
to "common general knowledge"; and 2 the entitlement of
the opponent to have access to documents in the possession
of IPONZ relating to antecedent patent applications relied
upon for ante-dating the priority date for the patent subject
of the proceedings.
1 The appropriate scope of pleading of
grounds of opposition, particularly references
to "common general knowledge".
In the course of the opposition process,9 the opponent filed a
notice of opposition and statement of case and the applicant
filed a counterstatement. The applicant's lawyers then requested
that paragraphs in the statement of case be struck out. These
paragraphs related to the ground of opposition that the
application was obvious and lacked any inventive step. The
opponent had pleaded 10 particulars alleged to have been
common general knowledge at the priority date, and also
made further reference to what constituted common general
knowledge, such as publications.
The Hearings Office of IPONZ twice rejected requests to
delete all of these references to common general knowledge,
and had confirmed that the opponent's pleadings did not
need to be amended in any way, because the opponent was
not seeking to assert common general knowledge as a ground
of opposition in its own right. Instead, it was cited to reflect
the state of knowledge of the skilled addressee, providing a
contextual framework within which the claims were to be
assessed against prior use and prior publication material to
determine if what was claimed was indeed obvious. The
Assistant Commissioner, however, upheld the applicant's
objection to all of these references to common general know
ledge, and ordered that all of those references be struck out of
the statement of case. The appellant/opponent now chal
lenged that ruling, seeking the reinstatement in the statement
of case of the references to common general knowledge.
The Court said that argument on a challenge to the grant
of a patent on the ground of obviousness is conventionally
assessed through the eyes of a skilled reader, deemed to be
imbued with the "common general knowledge" in the rele
vant field in which the claimed invention arises.10
The Court discussed the decision in Benz & Another's
Application for a Patent,11 concluding that it focused on
reference to common general knowledge as an independent
ground of opposition, rather than as a contextual aid to
other, statutorily recognised, grounds of opposition. The
Judge treated Benz as requiring the striking out from the
notice of opposition of references to common general know
ledge because of a concern that it was indeed being set up as
an apparent ground of opposition, intended to stand on its
own.
The Judge said that the Assistant Commissioner saw
nothing in the distinction between the references in the Benz
case being in the notice of opposition, rather than as here in
the statement of case. However, the Judge said that reg 48
required that the statement of case should set out fully the
facts upon which the opponent relied, fairly informing the
applicant of the detail of the grounds of opposition to be
argued. The Judge said that a fair and adequate process
ought to provide for adequate warning of the opposing cases,
to enable orderly preparation of the evidence on relevant
issues. Here, the extent of references to common general
knowledge in the statement of case that had been struck out
foreshadowed the nature and extent of common general
knowledge upon which the opponent intended to rely, and
clearly fell short of pleading matters of evidence.
The Judge also accepted that the contemporary approach
to pleading was to avoid "trial by ambush", and this was
consistent with at least allowing if not requiring some
outline of the way in which common general knowledge
would be called in aid, as was pleaded here.12 In addition, full
pleadings assisted the Intellectual Property Office ofNew Zealand
IPONZ in situations where the opponent might not ulti
mately contest the grant of patent, but where IPONZ was
Patents Act 1953, s 21 and Patents Regulations 1954, reg 481.
Referring to Winclsurfer International Inc v Tabur Marine [1985] RPC 59 at 79.
[1958] RPC 78.
Referring to Donovan v Graham High Court, Auckland CP1908/89, 22 May 1990, Eichelbaum CJ and Ratiopharm
v Napp [2008] EWI-IC 3070 Pat.
9.
10.
11.
12.
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still charged with assessing the application from the stand
point of the public interest. The Judge said that undertaking
the assessment where an opponent does not appear was
likely to be improved by a statement of case that pleaded
fully the grounds of opposition, and the factual matters to be
relied on in support of those grounds. The Judge said that the
Assistant Commissioner misconceived the purpose of plead
ings, in holding that statements of what was the common
general knowledge must be left to the evidence stage. The
Judge said that, as with all factual allegations in pleadings,
the assertion of what constituted the common general know
ledge did not give that assertion any status as being the
truthful or unquestionable state of the relevant knowledge.
Rather, it was the opponent's contention of what would be
found, on evidence to be adduced, to be the state of know
ledge. If an opponent's argument on one or more grounds of
opposition was to be supported by reference to common
general knowledge, then as a matter of pleading the oppo
nent should commit to an outline of the respects in which
common general knowledge would be claimed to be relevant,
and the applicant was entitled to know that in considering its
response. It was useful for it to be signalled as a matter of
pleading to enable the applicant to consider the strength of
evidence available to challenge that assertion.
The Judge held that there was every reason for inclusion
of the references to common general knowledge, and no
countervailing justification for their being excluded. The
Judge allowed this first aspect of the appeal, and directed that
the opponent's statement of case was to be reinstated in its
original form.
2 Access to documents relating to
antecedent patent applications relied upon for
ante-dating the priority date for the patent
subject of the proceedings
The patent application subject of proceedings was a divi
sional of the parent, which in turn was a divisional of the
grandparent application, so that the patent application now
opposed was antedated to the priority date of the grandpa
rent application. IPONZ had published the opposed patent
after acceptance, but not the parent or grandparent applica
tions which had not proceeded. As a result, potential oppo
nents could not verify for themselves whether IPONZ had
correctly relied on grounds for the extent of backdating
accepted.
The opponent here sought access to the relevant docu
ments, and this was considered by the Assistant Commis
sioner. The opponent argued that the Official Information
Act 1982 applied unless there was a specific statutory restric
tion, and this was accepted by the Assistant Commissioner.
The applicant argued that challenge to the priority date
allocated on acceptance of an application was not a ground
for opposition to registration of a patent under s 21 of the
Patents Act 1953, so that challenge to the priority date could
not be relevantly argued in opposition proceedings, and the
documents that might be sought to challenge the allocation
of the priority date were therefore irrelevant to any valid
grounds of opposition. The Assistant Commissioner accepted
that the opponent could not challenge the priority date
allocated as an aspect of its argument on opposition to the
application, and treated the decision to accord divisional
status to an application, and the consequent backdating of
the priority date, as the exercise of a discretion that an
opponent who later appears cannot question. The Judge,
however, held that this was an incorrect approach to the
scope of grounds of opposition, and that in circumstances
such as these, an opponent seeking to challenge the priority
date allocated by IPONZ was not doing so as a ground of
opposition. Rather, it was a contextual fact that was extremely
important to the strength of arguments open to the opponent
on some, at least, of the statutory grounds of opposition
recognised in s 21.
The Judge said that the purpose of opposition proceedings
included appropriate testing of the entitlement to the statu
tory monopoly afforded by a patent, and that it was in the
public interest that that testing be undertaken on a fully
informed basis, to ensure that a full contest preceded the
decision to recognise the statutory entitlements that fo
llowed. The Judge did not accept that opponents must in all
circumstances run their opposition on terms inevitably accep
ting the correctness of the priority date nominated by IPONZ,
as this deprived the process of the appropriate rigour and
afforded applicants the opportunity for unintended advan
tage. The Judge therefore held that it was not the case that
lack of relevance of these documents to an opponent consti
tuted a ground for resisting their disclosure.
The Assistant Commissioner also held that provisions of
s 91 of the Patents Act restricted disclosure of the applica
tions and any specifications for the parent and grandparent
applications. The Judge considered s 91, in light of the
positive obligation to advertise in s 202. Interpretation of
the phrase "the specification or specifications filed in pursu
ance thereof ..." in s 202 of the Act was central to the
argument, the issue being whether the phrase encompassed
the documents of the parent and grandparent applications as
part of the accepted application. The Assistant Commi
ssioner said that it did not. The Judge said that the conse
quence of this approach was that less was publicised in
relation to a divisional application than was the case for an
original application, and that potential opponents were not
in the same position. For an original application, the basis of
attribution of the priority date was clear from the terms of
the provisional and complete specifications, but for a divi
sional application, the Assistant Commissioner's approach
would prevent access to the documents establishing the chain
of entitlement back to whatever priority date had been
accepted by IPONZ. The Judge said that, conceptually at
least, that led to the undesirable notion of applicants attemp
ting to "bury the trail" by which they sought to refer back to
the earliest possible date, by insisting that there not be
publication of the antecedent applications, the existence of
which was critical to an entitlement to an earlier priority date
than that which would be achieved if the currently opposed
application had to stand on its own. That was an undesirable
inconsistency.
The Judge also considered the statutory context for s 91,
particularly the preceding sections, and reg l29e of the
Patents Regulations 1954. The Judge held that these provi
sions supported a broader reading of the scope of what
would be the specifications filed "in pursuance" of a particu
lar application. The Judge concluded that, in circumstances
such as the present, it was difficult to conceive any material
prejudice to an applicant for a patent arising from publica
tion of the parent and grandparent applications on which a
divisional application depends for backdating of the priority
date. The entitlement to reach back in that way depended on
the subsequent applications being in the same terms as the
preceding ones. The practice on this was confirmed in Patent
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Office Practice Note No 8. It followed that, if the latest
application was entitled to ante-dating, then the contents of
the prior applications would not reveal anything that is not
inevitably publicised on publication of the current applica
tion.
The Judge held that the Assistant Commissioner erred as a
matter of law in coming to the conclusion that IPONZ was
constrained by the terms of s 911 or otherwise, from
including within the material able to be disclosed, once the
patent application was advertised, the comparable docu
ments in respect of preceding applications, and the Judge
itemised the documents to which the opponent was entitled.
The appellant or opponent therefore succeeded on both
aspects of appeal and was entitled to costs.
Irnellectual Property /n New Zealand covers tradftional
intellectual property law topics such as the laws of
copyright, patents, registered designs and trade marks.
This book also offers a discussion of the emerging law
applying to computer technology and the Internet
and considersissues of particular importance to New
Zealand, such as the intellectual property rights of Mann.
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